1. Introduction

The return of Donald J. Trump to the White House marks not merely a political shift in Washington, but the reassertion of a worldview that regards the liberal international order as obsolete and the world as a battleground of realpolitik. As one commentator succinctly observed, Trump governs with the conviction that “the ascendancy of the liberal order was over and the world of cutthroat power politics was back” (Brands 2025). In this renewed era of geopolitical confrontation, structural rivalry between the United States and China has intensified, while China has consolidated its ties with Russia, Iran, and North Korea into a strategic counterbalance to U.S.-led alliances (Shi 2015; Ferguson 2025).

This emerging global polarity is increasingly evident in the Arctic, a region once regarded as insulated from strategic competition. The Arctic is rapidly transforming into a contested geopolitical frontier, where not only the United States, China, and Russia project national interests, but also where the normative foundations of regional governance are being tested (Chan 2024; Mathis 2023). The area’s immense resource potential—including hydrocarbons, rare earth elements, and fisheries—along with its rising geostrategic value in global shipping and military posture, has drawn unprecedented attention from both Arctic and non-Arctic states (EIA 2012).¹⁾

Over the next four years, the Arctic may experience transformative shifts in governance and science diplomacy (Dodds 2025). The region’s long-standing governance architecture, centered around the Arctic Council, now faces disruptive pressures from environmental crises, technological change, and—most urgently—geopolitical fragmentation. As Kobzeba and Todorov observe, these conver ging challenges have pushed Arctic governance into a “perilous moment,” particularly with the erosion of the normative presumption that the Arctic is a zone of peaceful cooperation (Kobzeva and Todorov 2023).

The second Trump administration is poised to reinforce this trajectory. While the Biden administration reaffirmed multilateralism and pursued a cooperative Arctic strategy under the 2022 U.S. Arctic Strategy, a second Trump presidency is likely to amplify a more unilateral, security- centric, and transactional approach to Arctic diplomacy. At the same time, Russia’s war in Ukraine and its resulting exclusion from Arctic Council activities have further fragmented regional cooperation. Meanwhile, China’s self- declared identity as a “Near-Arctic State” and its expansive Polar Silk Road initiative challenge the current governance (SCIO 2018) paradigm rooted in sovereign rights and the law of the sea.

For observer states, such as the Republic of Korea (hereinafter “South Korea”), the Arctic represents both an opportunity and a challenge. As a technologically advanced and diplomatically agile middle power, South Korea must recalibrate its Arctic policy to ensure continued relevance and participation amid great power competition. While legal norms—particularly those enshrined in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—continue to frame Arctic interactions, the effectiveness of these norms in the face of heightened geopolitical tension remains uncertain.

In parallel, South Korea has also entered a new political chapter with the recent inauguration of a new president who has pledged to elevate the nation’s strategic engagement in Arctic affairs. Signaling a more proactive and future-oriented Arctic policy, the administration has emphasized the importance of securing access to Arctic sea routes and announced plans to enhance the operational capacity of Busan Port as a hub for Arctic shipping. This domestic shift underscores Seoul’s recognition of the Arctic’s growing economic and geopolitical significance, and its intent to position South Korea as a responsible and capable stakeholder in the evolving governance of the region.

This article explores how the second Trump administration is likely to reshape U.S. Arctic policy, how this shift may affect the institutional viability of the Arctic Council, and what strategic directions South Korea should pursue in response. In doing so, the article argues that Korea’s future Arctic diplomacy must be rooted in legal coherence, scientific engagement, and bilateral adaptability—while remaining attentive to the evolving geostrategic calculus in the High North.

2. The Development of U.S. Arctic Policy from Reagan to Biden

The United States is a major Arctic stakeholder, accounting for approximately 15% of the Arctic region due to its sovereignty over Alaska (Muntean 2024). Since the Cold War, U.S. Arctic policy has evolved through a succession of strategic doctrines and executive frameworks. The first official articulation came under the Reagan administration in 1983 with the publication of the “United States Arctic Policy,” which emphasized vital national interests in the region—namely, national security, natural resources, energy, and technological advancement (WH 1983).

Subsequent administrations built upon this foundation. In 2009, the George W. Bush administration released a revised “Arctic Region Policy,” and in 2013, the Obama administration issued the “National Strategy for the Arctic Region.” (WH 2009; WH 2013) This strategy was accompanied by an Implementation Plan in January 2014, which identified 36 specific initiatives. In 2015, Obama further institutionalized Arctic engagement through Executive Order 13689, entitled “Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic.” (Administration of Barack Obama 2015).

The first Trump administration (2017–2021) marked a notable departure in tone and substance. Its Arctic strategy was characterized by a combination of unilateralism, energy dominance, and geopolitical confrontation—especially vis- à-vis China. Trump’s foreign policy toward the Arctic reflected his broader diplomatic philosophy: skepticism of multilateralism, transactional alliances, and a reassertion of U.S. sovereignty (Dodds 2025). China’s increasing presence in the Arctic drew particular scrutiny from Washington. After Beijing declared itself a “Near-Arctic State” in 2018, then–Secretary of State Mike Pompeo publicly rejected China’s claims and ambitions in the region. The Trump administration viewed China’s Arctic involvement not merely as commercial expansion but as a creeping strategic threat (Muntean 2024; Hounshell 2019).

A dramatic illustration of Trump’s Arctic posture was his August 2019 proposal to purchase Greenland from Denmark—an idea that was quickly dismissed by Copenhagen and Nuuk but revealed Washington’s concern over Chinese investment in Greenland’s critical infrastructure and rare earth resources (OtC 2019). Greenland’s geostrategic location—long recognized since World War II—alongside its natural resource wealth, made it a focal point of great power competition (Svendsen 2025). While the proposal itself was politically unfeasible, it underscored Washington’s intent to reassert U.S. primacy in the Arctic’s emerging power geometry, the deeper strategic logic of which is discussed below.

The Trump administration’s pushback against Chinese influence extended to blocking several infrastructure projects in Greenland (Raditio 2019). In 2017, a Chinese firm attempted to purchase a naval base site in Greenland, prompting U.S. intervention via Denmark on national security grounds. Later proposals for airport expansion and mining ventures involving Chinese investors were similarly curtailed due to security concerns (Matzen 2017; Dodds 2025; Hinshaw and Page 2019; Finne 2018). These developments underscored a broader U.S. approach to preemptive-denial to preserve strategic dominance in the Arctic.

In a tangible demonstration of commitment, the United States reopened its consulate in Nuuk in June 2020 for the first time since 1953 and pledged a $12.1 million economic assistance package to Greenland earlier that year. These moves signaled a reinvigorated American presence on the island—both diplomatically and strategically.

The Biden administration (2021–2025) represented a return to multilateral engagement, albeit within an increasingly fragmented Arctic landscape. In October 2022, the administration published its “National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” replacing Obama’s 2013 version. The new strategy centered around four pillars: security, climate change, sustainable economic development, and international cooperation (Muntean 2024; Lackenbauer and Lanteigne 2025). Highlighting its commitment to deter threats to the U.S. homeland, it emphasized the necessity of improving U.S. maritime domain awareness and protecting freedom of navigation in accordance with international rules, together with disaster response and icebreaking capabilities in the Arctic. In October 2023, Biden followed through with a detailed implementation plan outlining 13 strategic objectives aligned with the 2022 Arctic Strategy (WH 2023).²⁾

Meanwhile, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 deeply disrupted the Arctic Council. On March 3, 2022, the other Arctic states (A7) suspended their participation in Council meetings, citing Russia’s breach of foundational norms (DoS 2022; Nordic Cooperation 2022; Overfield 2022). Following the invasion, the Biden administration coordinated extensive sanctions targeting Russian state assets, economic sectors, and strategic industries. These efforts were echoed by major Western allies and partners—including South Korea (Welt 2023). In response, Russia deepened its Arctic cooperation with China, including in energy and research projects, presenting a counter-narrative to Western Arctic governance frameworks.

While adversarial in posture, Biden’s Arctic policy also carried over aspects of Trump’s initiatives. For example, the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) Pact, originally launched under Trump’s 2020 presidential memorandum, was continued and expanded by the Biden administration (Muntean 2024). In fiscal year 2023, the Biden government spent over $550 million on Arctic research. Notably, the Biden administration also created the post of Ambassador- at-Large for Arctic Affairs in October 2024, reflecting institutional recognition of the Arctic’s rising diplomatic significance.

In sum, U.S. Arctic policy has gradually evolved from Reagan’s emphasis on national interest to Obama’s cooperative governance model, Trump’s assertive containment strategy, and Biden’s blend of multilateral diplomacy with strategic investment. Looking ahead, a second Trump administration will likely intensify the competitive framing of the Arctic—particularly in relation to China—while building upon selective elements of Biden-era policies.

3. Anticipating Trump 2.0: Future Directions in U.S. Arctic Policy

A growing chorus of political scientists contends that a new “axis of revisionist powers”—comprising China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia—has coalesced around a shared objective: to challenge the liberal international order and, specifically, to weaken U.S. global leadership (Mastro 2024; Brands 2025). These states are increasingly viewed as threatening the structural balance of power, particularly across Eurasia. At the outset of Donald Trump’s second term, Mitch McConnell, the longest-serving Senate party leader in U.S. history has argued that Trump “inherited a world far more hostile to U.S. interests than the one he left behind four years ago” (McConnell 2025). McConnell observed that the four revisionist states “are working more closely than ever to undermine the U.S.-led order that has underpinned Western peace and prosperity for nearly a century” (McConnell 2025).

At the personal level, Trump’s worldview appears rooted in the ideological legacy of mid-twentieth-century American anticommunism—an era marked by religious moralism, ideological rigidity, and suspicion toward liberal internationalism (Kimmage 2025) This ideological backdrop informs his emphasis on unilateralism, security self-reliance, and strategic containment. At the regional level, as Russia and China extend their activities across economic, informational, and military spheres near North America, the Arctic has emerged as the only theater where the United States simultaneously confronts both great power competitors in close proximity—thereby elevating the region’s geostrategic importance in U.S. security planning (Tingstad et al. 2024).

China, in particular, is viewed as a long-term strategic competitor that poses serious challenges to U.S. interest. Accordingly, a growing number of U.S. policymakers and commentators argue that the second Trump administration should prioritize the enhancement of hard power—including military readiness—and foster the development of new capabilities to counterbalance Chinese influence (McConnell 2025). Within this framework, the Arctic is no longer a peripheral concern but a theater of strategic contestation where new capabilities must be demonstrated and defended.

In theory, if China’s engagement in the Arctic were benign—limited to trade, research, or scientific exploration—it might not provoke U.S. opposition. However, concerns persist that China’s Arctic ambitions are not entirely benign, particularly due to its opaque policy intentions, potential for dual-use infrastructure, and activities that blur the lines between civilian and military operations (Tatlow 2024; Puranen and Kopra 2023; OSD 2020). These concerns mirror similar anxieties in the Antarctic, where Chinese stations are believed to potentially serve military functions alongside scientific ones (Muntean 2024). Admittedly, U.S. analysts warn that China is adopting a strategy of subtle and selective resistance against existing global norms, aiming to incrementally undermine the rules-based international order rather than openly contesting it (Rinehart and Elias 2023).

In response, the United States has increasingly embraced a “denial-based” strategy intended to block China’s deeper integration into Arctic governance structures, scientific initiatives, and infrastructure development (Karlin 2024). This policy direction was evident during Trump’s first term and is expected to intensify in his second. Particular concern centers on Greenland, where Chinese investments in rare earth minerals, mining infrastructure, and port development are interpreted in Washington as potential mechanisms for projecting strategic influence into the Arctic and North Atlantic.

China has consistently emphasized the commercial value of Arctic sea routes, particularly the Northern Sea Route and the future Transpolar Passage. From China’s perspective, these routes promise significant logistical advantages in connecting East Asia with Europe. However, some experts argue that this emphasis on economic efficiency masks deeper geostrategic motivations—namely, to reduce reliance on traditional maritime chokepoints like the Malacca Strait and to assert influence over critical arteries of global trade:³⁾ A recent study found that a distant naval blockade would disrupt 39.9 percent of China's GDP (CRS 2025; Brooks and Vagle 2025).

Furthermore, China appears to understand that the Arctic represents a strategic region for projecting military capabilities, much like Russia, which has long perceived the Arctic as a launchpad for projecting power (Tingstad et al. 2024). In this context, Greenland holds exceptional strategic significance. The Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) in Greenland has been a critical asset for North American defense since the 1950s, serving as a key node in the United States' Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. As mentioned above, China’s interest in investing in Greenland can be interpreted not merely as commercial opportunism but as a calculated move to establish a strategic foothold in the Arctic. Whether driven by military or economic motivations, such a presence is viewed in Washington as a potential threat (Lackenbauer and Lanteigne 2025). Consequently, President Trump’s revived interest in acquiring Greenland—initially proposed in 2019 and recently reiterated—is best understood not as a whimsical suggestion, but as a calculated effort to prevent China and Russia from gaining a commanding position in the region (Zellen 2025; Svendsen 2025; Dodds 2025).

In a sense, Russia has further facilitated China’s growing Arctic ambitions. In 2022 and 2023, Chinese and Russian naval forces conducted joint operations near Alaska’s Aleutian Islands, followed by expanded operations in the Bering Sea in 2024. Additionally, in July 2024, the two countries executed joint aerial exercises within the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)—marking a historic first (Williams et al. 2024). The Chinese Coast Guard’s entry into the Arctic Ocean in September 2024 symbolized a new phase in China’s regional presence, particularly along the Northern Sea Route. These operations were underpinned by a memorandum of understanding between China’s Coast Guard and Russia’s Federal Security Service on maritime law enforcement cooperation. These developments not only underscore the growing military alignment between the two powers but also highlight the Arctic’s rising importance as a theater of strategic convergence (Tingstad et al. 2024; Choi 2024).⁴⁾ The pattern continued into 2025, with U.S. reporting and media confirming renewed Sino-Russian naval activity near Alaska, signaling a steady normalization of joint presence in Bering–Chukchi approaches.

A “Near-Arctic” China’s investments in the Arctic have grown steadily since the launch of its Polar Silk Road initiative in 2018. By 2022, Beijing had committed over $90 billion to Arctic projects, spanning infrastructure, scientific research, and energy sectors in countries such as Iceland, Finland, and Norway (Svendsen 2025). Central to these efforts is China’s involvement in Russia’s Yamal LNG project and the 2023 titanium extraction agreement in the Russian Arctic. Beijing has also pursued mining opportunities in Greenland, the Canadian Arctic, and Alaska, which remains a leading export destination. Beyond natural resources, Chinese firms have invested in Nordic logistics and telecommunications networks, while the Chinese transportation company COSCO continues to explore the commercial viability of the Northern Sea Route. These engagements reflect China’s intention to intertwine commercial presence with long-term geostrategic positioning.

As the preceding discussion indicates, the second Trump administration will increasingly find that the Arctic is caught up in a wider matrix of concerns which derives from a consortium that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea work together to fare against the United States (Dodds 2025). The Trump’s response to China’s Arctic expansion will include resisting China’s integration into regional governance frameworks, and blocking infrastructure investments deemed dual-use or security-sensitive. Such efforts were already evident in Trump’s first term. The broader security calculus that underpinned Trump’s ambitions to purchase Greenland—alongside more controversial ideas such as asserting U.S. control over the Panama Canal or renaming the Gulf of Mexico—reflects a pattern of provocative initiatives grounded in geostrategic concerns. These maneuvers aim to secure access to critical geographic bottlenecks and resource-rich territories before adversaries can establish influence.

From a legal standpoint, the second Trump administration is expected to maintain a firm stance on the navigational status of Arctic sea routes, particularly the Northern Sea Route (claimed by Russia) and the Northwest Passage (claimed by Canada). Russia asserts that the Northern Sea Route comprises historic internal waters, while Canada applies the same status to the Northwest Passage through its Arctic Archipelago. Both states require foreign vessels to seek permission before transiting. Article 234 of UNCLOS permits coastal states to regulate marine traffic in ice-covered areas to prevent pollution, and both countries have enacted national laws grounded in this provision (Kobzeva and Todorov 2023). However, the United States has protested the historic water claims of both Russia and Canada, affirming that these two sea routes are “straits used for international navigation” in accordance with Part III (Articles 34–44) of UNCLOS that are open to shipping without interference from the adjacent state (Gavrilov et al. 2022; Lajeunesse and Huebert 2019).

Although the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, it recognizes this treaty’s provisions as customary international law and routinely conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) to contest excessive maritime claims. In this context, the Trump administration is likely to intensify FONOPs in the Russian Arctic, affirming freedom of navigation as a core national interest.⁵⁾ Of note, since 1982, the United States has proactively objected to and protested cases that it considers unlawful inasmuch as the freedom of the seas is at the core of U.S. national security.⁶⁾ The 2022 U.S. Arctic Strategy (WH 2022) and the 2024 Arctic Strategy (DoD 2024) of the Department of Defense both reaffirm the U.S. commitment to uphold navigational rights in accordance with international law, including in contested Arctic waters. These policies illustrate Washington’s resolve to counter Russian and Canadian assertions and maintain open access to strategic sea lanes.

While Trump’s “America First” approach typically favors bilateralism over multilateral forums, the Arctic Council may still be utilized as a diplomatic venue to advance U.S. interests. However, Trump's assertive "Make America Great Again" approach—prioritizing immediate gains and better deals even at the cost of trans-Atlantic relations—can be expected to adversely influence regional dynamics within Arctic diplomacy (Muntean 2024; Lackenbauer and Lanteigne 2025). The second Trump administration’s Arctic diplomacy is thus likely to exhibit a dual nature: participation in multilateral forums such as the Arctic Council for strategic messaging, combined with unilateral actions to assert U.S. dominance and deny adversarial influence.

From a practical standpoint, the Trump administration is expected to prioritize the expansion of the U.S. icebreaker fleet in line with the 2020 Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions. This includes efforts to build and deploy new polar security cutters by 2029 and bolster domestic shipbuilding capabilities under the ICE Pact. These initiatives reflect a long-standing gap in U.S. Arctic infrastructure, which the Trump administration seeks to address as part of a broader strategy of security preparedness. In October 2025, the White House and Finland announced an agreement for up to 11 medium Arctic Security Cutters to be co-built in Finland and the United States, underscoring Trump 2.0’s emphasis on rapid icebreaking capacity growth.

Finally, Trump’s return may also signal a recalibration of U.S. posture toward Russia. Despite ongoing tensions over Ukraine, the second Trump administration might reduce pressure on Moscow in favor of renewed engagement—particularly if doing so offers legal and diplomatic advantages in the Arctic.

At the time of this writing, diplomatic efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war are at a critical juncture, marked by stalled negotiations and conflicting demands (Potas 2025; ACEC 2025). Despite facing challenges in dealing with the war in Ukraine, the Trump administration has facilitated negotiations between Ukraine and Russia (Doornbos 2025). Trump’s willingness to negotiate directly with Russia and Ukraine suggests the potential for a limited détente, which could pave the way for pragmatic cooperation in Arctic affairs. Should diplomatic progress occur, Arctic diplomacy could advance to a new level of engagement, discussed further in the next chapter.

4. Arctic Governance by the Weakened Arctic Council Framework: Drawbacks and Challenges

Since the end of the Cold War, Arctic states have embraced cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution through institutions like the Arctic Council, founded in 1996. Emphasizing sustainable development and scientific collaboration while excluding military issues, the Council embodied the “Arctic spirit” or “High North, low tension principle” (CRS 2025). Historically, the Arctic Council has deliberately excluded military issues, instead focusing on sustainable development and regulating non-regional actors’ involvement—known as Arctic exceptionalism, which shielded the Arctic from global geopolitical conflicts (Murkowski 2021). However, the past decade has witnessed growing competition among the United States, Russia, and China, eroding this exceptional status. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point, further undermining the Council’s legitimacy and capacity to maintain regional stability.

International regimes like the Arctic Council serve as platforms for dialogue, reducing the costs of negotiation and mitigating misperceptions among states. Most of the times, progress is made once parties are brought to the bargaining table (Brilmayer 1996). Institutional liberalists argue that such regimes “improve communication between states, reducing uncertainty about intentions and increasing the capacity of governments to make credible, binding commitments to one another” (Friedberg 2005). Putting this theory into practice, the Council has promoted contact, communication, greater mutual understanding or at least reduced likelihood of gross misperception about goals and intentions for the Arctic among the United States, Russia, and China, amongst others. Furthermore, despite the fact that the Arctic Council is a soft law regime⁷⁾, it has even produced hard law instruments, including three legally binding agreements: the 2011 Search and Rescue Agreement, the 2013 Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Agreement, and the 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (CRS 2025).

Yet the Council now faces structural paralysis. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the seven other Arctic states (the A7) suspended participation in all Council meetings and subsidiary bodies. In response, Russia cut its funding and removed mentions of the Arctic Council from its policy documents (Quinn 2024; Kelly 2024; Schreiber 2022). Although Moscow resumed limited participation in early 2025, substantial political dialogue and coordinated action remain stalled (Xinhua 2025).⁸⁾

Even before the Ukraine crisis, questions were raised about the Council’s effectiveness and reform. China, as an observer, expressed skepticism about whether the Council is the optimal governance framework for the region (CRS 2025). Calls for a “re-set of the Council” to “fulfil its original ambition” have emerged internally, suggesting the need to adapt to new geopolitical and economic pressures (ICCC 2024). Scholars increasingly argue that a more robust institutional design—or even alternative regimes—may be necessary to address Arctic security and governance challenges (NIC 2021).

In essence, regimes reflect the interests of their key actors: in the case of the Arctic Council, there is no objection to acknowledging Russia as the most important player. On one side, Russia’s future in the Council remains uncertain (Kobzeva and Todorov 2023; Cusick 2024). Having withdrawn from the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in 2023 and floated the idea of exiting in the UNCLOS system—with support from the State Duma and the Ministry of Defense—Moscow may eventually disengage from the Arctic Council if its interests are sidelined (Todorov 2024). While such a move many not be imminent, Russia is likely to observe the developments surrounding the Arctic Council and wait until it finds critical anguish in the work of the organization (Edvardsen 2023; Vereykina 2024; PoR 2025).

On another side, Russia may develop alternative regimes in the Arctic, particularly with BRICS-aligned states involved (Bne IntelliNews 2023). Since the annexation of Crimea, efforts have intensified to build a network of “connector countries” open to economic and diplomatic engagement with Russia, signaling the rise of a new phase of “swing geopolitics” (Dodds 2025). Simultaneously, China has explored supplementary platforms, including Arctic Frontiers, and has promoted its “Near-Arctic State” identity alongside the Polar Silk Road (Kobzeva and Todorov 2023). These narratives aim to legitimize a greater role for China and counterbalance Western-led Arctic governance. Against this backdrop, the United States continues to pressure China to adhere to Council norms, warning that disruptive behavior could jeopardize its observer status (DoS 2019).

The Council’s inability to address security issues—in accordance with the Ottawa Declaration—further limits its relevance: security dialogues for the Arctic region are only available at the marginal or bilateral level. Historically, the United States, Russia, and to some extent Canada have opposed efforts to formalize the Council or strengthen its secretariat, preferring a minimalist structure (Balton 2021; Thiele 2018). By design, the vulnerability of the Arctic Council as a governing body has always been inherent for its governance system. This institutional weakness has become more pronounced in the current geopolitical climate.

Making matters worse, Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO, leaving Russia as the only non-NATO Arctic Council member, further complicates cooperation. Russia continues to maintain a robust Arctic military presence and allocates a significant share of its GDP to defense, and all other Arctic states (except Canada) have also increased military spending.⁹⁾ This militarization trend is becoming a new normal and will likely persist during the second Trump administration, causing an underlying tension in the practice of the Arctic Council (Preve 2024; SIPRI 2025).

Taken together, the Council’s limited mandate, governance shortcomings, the ongoing request of the (near) Arctic community for reform, and geopolitical fractures portend a prolonged period of dysfunction. Scientific collaboration may resume in limited forms, but high-level decision-making and coordinated regional governance will remain constrained. In particular, access to Russian Arctic zones for researchers from the non-friendly states is likely to be continually restricted (Breum 2024; Dodds 2025).

Still, the Cold War offers some precedent for cooperation even amid tension: the United States and the Soviet Union collaborated on Arctic wildlife conservation, including polar bear protection (Tingstad et al. 2024). However, the emerging rivalry within the Arctic Council—between the U.S.-led bloc and the Russia-China axis—threatens to destabilize its institutional core. Should this rivalry deepen, the Council may lose its central role, prompting the establishment of alternative governance regimes grounded in divergent norms and principles (Kobzeva and Todorov 2023).

Understanding these dynamics is essential for both Arctic and non-Arctic states, particularly observers like South Korea, which must adapt to the evolving institutional environment while continuing to advocate for rule-based cooperation. Strategic adaptation, especially through bilateral channels, will be the focus of the next chapter.

5. Recommendations for South Korea’s New Administration (2025–2030): Strategic Arctic Diplomacy

In an era of Arctic institutional gridlock and intensifying great-power rivalry—which continues to erode the resilience of the Arctic Council—observer states can no longer rely solely on multilateral channels to advance their interests (Kobzeva and Todorov 2023). For South Korea, the Arctic is not a remote periphery but an arena where science, technology, and strategic diplomacy intersect. The new administration must therefore pursue three interlinked objectives: first, to secure bilateral operating access for science and logistics; second, to align Korea’s industrial strengths in shipbuilding, ports, and icebreaking with Arctic infrastructure needs; and third, to exercise leadership in minilateral rule-building where diplomatic momentum exists, such as in the implementation of the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (CAOFA), the BBNJ Treaty, and Korea’s own Arctic Partnership Week (APW).

Against this backdrop, Korea—unlike the Arctic states exercising direct control over their respective territories—should complement its observer diplomacy with a network of functional bilateral agreements focusing on scientific data exchange, research logistics, and joint fieldwork permissions with Arctic coastal states. These bilateral channels will ensure that Korea maintains a steady research presence even when multilateral processes falter.

From a legal standpoint, South Korea’s engagement is grounded in UNCLOS, which provides the foundational legal framework for Arctic governance.¹⁰⁾ The 2008 Ilulissat Declaration affirmed that existing law of the sea provisions are sufficient for managing Arctic Ocean affairs, negating the need for a new legal regime. Within this legal architecture, Korea should actively reaffirm its status as a law-abiding, UNCLOS-driven actor through capacity- building programs on maritime safety, environmental law, and polar governance—both to strengthen its legitimacy and to distinguish itself from states pursuing resource extraction without transparent legal compliance.

Since attaining observer status in 2013, South Korea has progressively institutionalized its Arctic engagement. The 2013 Arctic Policy Master Plan and the 2018–2022 Policy Framework for the Promotion of Arctic Activities established a vision of Korea as both “pioneer” and “partner” in Arctic affairs (KMI 2019).¹¹⁾ The 2021 Polar Activities Promotion Act (KLRI 2021) and the First Basic Plan for the Promotion of Polar Activities (2023–2027) (hereinafter “The First Basic Plan”) have added a clear statutory basis, providing for next-generation icebreaking vessels, eco- friendly polar shipping technologies, and expanded scientific infrastructure (ROK 2021; KOPRI 2022). The new administration should operationalize these plans by setting measurable deliverables—such as launching at least one joint Arctic expedition annually with an Arctic coastal state and publishing open-access datasets from each mission—to enhance Korea’s credibility as a science partner rather than a political actor.

As a matter of geography and logistics, Russia remains an indispensable Arctic partner.¹²⁾ President Putin projected that cargo traffic along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) would reach nearly 100 million tons by 2030, and traffic between 2013 and 2023 has already grown by 37 percent (Svendsen 2025). A 2018 Polar Geography study notes that shipping from Busan to Rotterdam via the Northeast Passage could reduce distance by roughly 29 percent.¹³⁾ Yet Seoul’s Arctic ambitions have been impeded by its political estrangement from Moscow following alignment with NATO and support for Ukraine (Yun and Kim 2024).¹⁴⁾ Therefore, many experts analyze that making renewed Arctic cooperation between South Korea and Russia is unlikely in the short term (Heng and Freymann 2023). Nonetheless, while differences over Ukraine may persist, Korea should adopt a policy of pragmatic compartmentalization—maintaining cooperation with Russia in non-sanctioned, non-political fields such as climate science, maritime safety, scientific diplomacy, and infrastructure modernization.

In this regard, South Korea’s extensive scientific infrastructure, including the Dasan Arctic Station in Svalbard and the icebreaker Araon, offers a foundation for flexible science diplomacy.¹⁵⁾ Given the Trump administration’s likely emphasis on bilateral over multilateral frameworks in the mentality of a start-up (Kimmage 2025), Seoul should adopt a nimble and responsive Arctic strategy that capitalizes on ad hoc opportunities and evolving geopolitical conditions.

Russia, which controls roughly half the Arctic’s territory, population, and energy resources, and has the most at stake in absolute terms, remains indispensable to Arctic governance (CRS 2025; Breum 2024; Anthony et al. 2021). Historically, Russia has been reluctant to recognize the presence of non-Arctic states in the Arctic (Tingstad et al. 2024). Following the breakdown of cooperation within Western-led Arctic forums such as the Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Moscow has revised its Arctic strategy to prioritize bilateral engagement with non-Arctic states (Lipunov and Devyatkin 2023). In doing so, Russia has actively sought partnerships with non-Arctic countries like China on key initiatives such as the development of the Northern Sea Route (Zhou 2024; Dodds 2025; PoR 2025).

Purportedly, China needs Russia for a valuable energy supply, and Russia needs China for investment and markets. Yet, the Sino-Russian relationship is often characterized as a “marriage of convenience” fraught with historical mistrust and divergent strategic visions (Tingstad et al. 2024; Mastro 2024; Mitchell 2025). Notably, China’s depiction of the Arctic as “global commons” conflicts with Russia’s emphasis on sovereignty (DoD 2024; Dodds 2025). Should frictions intensify, Russia may seek alternatives to balance China’s expanding influence—offering an opportunity for South Korea, which is unburdened by expansionist narratives and with a proven track record in science, infrastructure, and energy cooperation, to re-emerge as a credible and technically capable partner.

To that end, Seoul should prepare to strengthen cooperation with Russia in critical sectors, starting with Arctic shipping. South Korea’s world-class shipbuilding capabilities, and advanced port systems demonstrated by the introduction of automated systems at Busan New Port in 2023 called Automated Guided Vehicles (AGVs) and automated systems,¹⁶⁾ can directly support Russian port modernization efforts (MOF 2023; PoR 2025). By offering unmanned and environmentally efficient cargo-handling technologies, South Korea can align economic interest with strategic engagement.

The election of President Lee Jae-myung in June 2025 provides a favorable window for recalibrating Arctic policy. Drawing inspiration from previous progressive administrations, such as President Roh Moo-hyun’s expansion of polar research and President Moon Jae-in’s New Northern Policy, which prioritized economic cooperation with Russia and Eurasia, Lee’s administration is expected to emphasize pragmatic northern diplomacy.¹⁷⁾ Reactivating intergovernmental consultations on Arctic shipping and logistics within the framework of the historic “Nine Bridges” initiative, which was suggested by Moon in 2017, could offer a practical starting point. A revived Korea–Russia working group on the NSR could also coordinate pilot voyages using Korea-built LNG carriers and ice-class cargo ships (Yoon 2017). Recently, Lee has publicly endorsed Busan’s Arctic task force and emphasized bipartisan support for Northern Sea Route development as a matter of national, not partisan, interest.¹⁸⁾

Energy cooperation offers another strategic pathway. South Korea has long depended on Russian oil, gas, and coal, and previously participated in Arctic LNG ventures like Yamal LNG. As sanctions evolve, Seoul should prepare for conditional re-entry into Arctic energy ventures by developing ESG-compliant investment guidelines and renewable-energy partnerships that meet emerging global sustainability norms (PoR 2018; Stapczynski 2024; Humpert 2024). The First Basic Plan already outlines Korea’s intention to promote Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG)-driven polar development through projects such as (a) eco-friendly small vessel technology development, (b) green and renewable energy development, and (c) establishing Arctic Circle carbon-zero energy self-sustaining infrastructures, including hydrogen energy (MOF 2022).

South Korea is also well-positioned to contribute to sustainable fisheries governance under the 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAOFA). The new administration should take the lead in organizing Asia’s first multinational high-latitude scientific survey—above 80°N (known as K-Arctic 2033)¹⁹⁾ —using the next-generation research icebreaker, thereby institutionalizing Korea’s role in ecosystem-based management (EBM) (Kobzeva and Todorov 2023). Such initiatives would also elevate Korea’s standing in the establishment of future regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs).²⁰⁾

Korea’s leadership is already evident in its early ratification of the Agreement under UNCLOS on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (commonly known as the BBNJ Agreement) on March 19, 2025 (MOFA 2025). This global treaty reinforces EBM principles and affirms Korea’s commitment to biodiversity governance beyond national jurisdiction (WWF 2020). Korea’s proactive engagement enhances its credibility in sustainable Arctic fisheries and complements efforts to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and promote marine environmental protection (ROK 2017). On September 19, 2025 the treaty reached 60 ratifications, triggering entry-into-force, amplifying Korea’s early-ratifier credibility in high-seas governance.

Another underexplored field is indigenous affairs. Russia’s recent emphasis on indigenous welfare offers scope for Korea to share its expertise in public health and sustainable food systems. Seoul should establish a “Korea–Arctic Indigenous Cooperation Fund,” co-financing pilot projects in nutrition, education, and tele-health services, thereby translating Korea’s development experience into Arctic social capital.

Regionally, reviving the Trilateral Dialogue on Arctic Cooperation among Korea, China, and Japan would help restore a missing layer of coordination among Asia’s observer states (Bennett 2017; MOFA 2016). This dialogue could be upgraded into a Track 1.5 forum engaging industry and academia, producing joint statements on marine research standards and sustainable navigation.

Finally, Seoul must elevate Arctic Partnership Week (APW) as a globally recognized multilateral forum. As the only Arctic event hosted by a non-Arctic state, APW serves as a vital platform for connecting governments, researchers, and industries (MOF 2022; 2024). These measures would consolidate APW as a fixture in the global Arctic calendar and strengthen Korea’s branding as a constructive, non- territorial stakeholder.

In sum, South Korea’s Arctic diplomacy must balance flexibility and foresight. Through bilateral engagement with key Arctic players, pragmatic partnerships, and institutional leadership in science and governance, the new administration can secure national interests and elevate Korea’s profile as a sustainable and reliable actor in the Arctic.

6. Conclusion

Forecasting the trajectory of U.S. Arctic policy under President Trump’s second administration is inherently uncertain (China File Conversation 2025). His approach to foreign policy—rooted in transactional logic, national self-interest, and strategic ambiguity—resists conventional theoretical prediction (Levy 2008). Nonetheless, it is likely that “hard security” concerns will dominate his Arctic strategy, consistent with the broader “America First” doctrine (Brands 2025; Kirchner 2023).

While adversarial relations with Russia will persist in many domains, Arctic diplomacy may witness renewed dialogue. Prior to the Ukraine war, the United States and Russia maintained limited but constructive cooperation in the region (Midgett 2018; Schreiber 2021; Bye 2021; Gonzales 2021). A second Trump administration may seek détente with Moscow in pursuit of Arctic advantages, especially if a negotiated end to the war becomes politically feasible. Such a thaw could weaken Sino-Russian alignment and recalibrate strategic balances in the Arctic (Mitchell 2025).

However, Trump’s skepticism toward multilateral institutions poses challenges to the stability of the Arctic Council, the center of Arctic governance (Woods 2025). Already strained by Russia’s partial disengagement and China’s growing assertiveness, the Council may endure further fragmentation if U.S. support wanes (Devyatkin 2023). This institutional fragility underscores the urgency for alternative pathways to governance, particularly through science diplomacy, flexible coalitions, and regional forums.

Amid these shifting dynamics, South Korea must seize the moment. The unexpected ascent of President Lee Jae-myung presents an opportunity to elevate Arctic diplomacy as a national strategic priority. Bilateral initiatives grounded in scientific cooperation and sustainable development can help reestablish ties with Russia while advancing Korea’s interests. Of course, the attempt to enhance bilateral Arctic diplomacy should be in addition to fulfilling its obligations as an observer state in the Arctic Council.

Finally, the Korean government must remain mindful that despite warming trends, the Arctic remains an operationally challenging region due to severe weather, unpredictable sea ice, and limited infrastructure. Moreover, respect for international law and the rule of law must remain at the core of Korea’s Arctic policy. As noted by an Arctic governance expert, “[w]ithout respect for international law, cooperation on matters of Arctic governance would be meaningless” (Kirchner 2023).

If South Korea consistently anchors its Arctic policy in legal principles, scientific contribution, and pragmatic diplomacy, it will not only safeguard its national interests but also emerge as a sought-after partner in global polar governance—advancing peace, cooperation, and sustainable prosperity in one of the world’s most critical regions.